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Abstract
It is known that the incompleteness of asset markets causes ineﬃciency in almost every equilibrium.
Yet unexplored is the ”size” of this ineﬃciency.
The size of a Pareto improvement is the total willingness to pay for it, out of current consumption.
Ineﬃciency is the maximum size of any Pareto improving reallocation.
Ineﬃciency of US consumption in middle age is computed to be 10-11% of total consumption in youth,
for CRRA parameters 1.5-3.25, in a calibrated economy.
The ineﬃciency of a general economy is approximated. A natural approximation, based on mar-
ginal rates of substitution (MRS), is preposterously crude in the calibrated economy, owing to a law of
d i m i n i s h i n gw i l l i n g n e s st op a y .
Alternative approximations end up being functions of a classical notion, weighted social welfare
maximized subject to resource constraints. They are simple, sharper in general and accurate in the
calibrated economy.
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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
Suppose a policy maker wants to Pareto improve on an allocation parameterized by future uncertainty, and
carrying out any reallocation involves a present cost. A basic question is whether any Pareto improving
reallocation is ”worth” this cost. Quantitatively, ”how ineﬃcient” is an allocation parameterized by future
uncertainty?
Consider households with preferences for consumption xh =( xh
0,x h
1) of a current amount and an
uncertain future amount. The current willingness to pay for a stochastic change zh in future consumption
is by deﬁnition the maximum value wh making household h weakly prefer xh +(−wh,zh) to xh. In this
sense (−w,z) deﬁnes a weak Pareto improvement, whose size is the total willingness to pay Σwh. The




This measure is for ordinal preferences and in real terms, lying between 0 and Σxh
0. It is 0 exactly at
Pareto eﬃciency. Debreu’s (1951) coeﬃcient of resource utilization is similar, the main distinction being that
ours requires payment in the present only—when there is willingness—whereas his in the future as well—when
there is moral hazard in place of willingness.1
The measure is not the welfare cost of the ”business cycle,” the focus of a large literature2 since Lucas
(1987), nor of a ”permanent shock,” a ﬁtter interpretation of the future here. A single, representative
household illustrates: Pareto eﬃciency and ρx =0 are automatic, whereas the welfare cost of a large
permanent shock is hardly 0. The randomness of total income is ﬁx e di no u rq u e s t i o n ,b u ts m o o t h a b l ei n
Lucas’; our payment is for allocating, Lucas’ is for eliminating, this randomness.
There is a literature on ineﬃciency of equilibria involving asset markets, when these incompletely insure
against the future. It detects the generic existence of Pareto improvements, but does not quantify their
signiﬁcance—owing to the underlying technique, as explained below. This generic existence is robust. For
economies with multiple goods, it survives various limits on reallocations: rebalances of portfolios, Geanako-
plos and Polemarchakis (1986), Geanakoplos et al. (1990), and Stiglitz (1982); lump sum changes in current
income plus a mild instrument, Citanna, Kajii, and Villanacci (1998); taxation of asset trades, Citanna,
Polemarchakis, and Tirelli (2006); anonymous income taxes, Tirelli (2003); excise taxes or capital gains
taxes, Turner (2005). For economies with a single good3, it survives behavioral agents, Nagata (2005). We
focus on quantifying ineﬃciency, not on detecting it.
Equipped with a measure of ineﬃciency, we ask two questions:
• How ineﬃcient is an equilibrium allocation, calibrated to capture many people facing a major risk
against which insurance markets are incomplete?
• Is there a closed formula for ineﬃciency, to invite research about the relation between the size of
ineﬃciency and the underlying economy?
1Only in Debreu (1959) is time explicitly recognized.
2E.g. Barro (2007), ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (1989), Krebs (2003), Krusell and Smith (1999), Kurz (2005), Levine and Zame (2002),
Ríos-Rull (1994).
3Magill and Quinzii (1996) is the reference here.
11.1 Estimation of the ineﬃciency of US middle age consumption
In applying this measure of ineﬃciency, it is fundamental to specify ﬁrst the underlying uncertainty. We
highlight a major risk faced by US youth, income in middle age. This risk is underscored by the high income
mobility and inequality. Income belongs to a diﬀerent quintile in middle age than it did in youth with high
probability, at least .46 according to Gottschalk and Danzinger (1997).4 At the time of the middle aged,
any quintile’s median income exceeds the preceding quintile’s by 45% or more, McNeill (1999).
We must estimate the consumption distribution and preferences. To estimate the former, we adjust data
on income distribution by data on savings rates. To estimate the latter, we ﬁx them to be time additive, von
Neumann-Morgenstern, v(x0)+δ
hΣπsv(xs), with felicity v = c1−β
1−β that has CRRA β > 1, and a probability
space capturing Gottschalk and Danzinger’s probabilities of transitioning between quintiles. Preferences
diﬀer only in the patience parameter δ
h, calibrated to make the estimated consumption distribution optimal
given the interest rate.




= .10−.11 of their total current consumption for a weakly Pareto improving reallocation of their total
future consumption, if the CRRA is 1.5 ↔ 3.25 : 5
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These estimates, though rooted in data, are limited in their reliability by the crudeness of the state-
preference model, which ignores how the reallocations underlying (1) aﬀect incentives for creating income.
Still, for many models ineﬃciency is quantiﬁable in the same spirit, as the supremum total willingness to
pay for a Pareto improving feasible change.
1.2 Formulas for approximate ineﬃciency of a general economy
A formula for the ineﬃciency of a general economy is elusive, even if a formula for willingness to pay exists.
Nonetheless, we
• note a formula, if preferences are representable and quasilinear in current consumption
• derive a natural formula Lx for approximate ineﬃciency of a general economy, linear in marginal
rates of substitution
• note how crude Lx is in the calibrated economy, and why by a law of diminishing willingness to pay
4Incomes are from a panel. This mobility is beyond that associated with income being monotone in age.
5For Kocherlakota (1996), the plotted range 1.5 − 5 is empirically wide.
2• derive discrete and quadratic formulas Dx,Q x for approximate ineﬃciency of a general economy
• prove both alternatives are generally sharper, and note their accuracy in the calibrated economy
• relate Dx,Q x and a classical notion, social welfare maximized subject to resource constraints
• extend the results to economies with multiple goods
We stop short of theoretical applications of these approximations, a future topic. Throughout, we assume
preferences admit time separable representations, u0 + u1.
At w o - s t e pmethod drives all approximations of ineﬃciency. First, we derive an upper bound w ≤ ˆ w
on the willingness to pay for a given change z in future consumption. Second, we compute ˆ ρx, the value
of problem (1) relaxed to supx1+zÀ0,Σzh=0 Σ ˆ wh or an upper bound thereof—this ˆ ρx is the method’s
approximation.
1.2.1 Marginal rates of substitution are a poor foundation
Marginal rates of substitution are appealing. They detect ineﬃciency both theoretically—that households’
marginal rates of substitution are not all equal—and practically—that small Pareto improving reallocations
solve some linear system. Being so good at detecting ineﬃciency, they should be good at quantifying it.
Speciﬁcally, a natural approximation of the willingness to pay for a change z in future consumption is
∇z, where ∇∈RS is the vector of marginal rates of substitution of current income for future income. The
two-step method then yields the linear approximation of ineﬃciency (theorem 1):





where 5∗ := (maxh 5h
s)s is the stochastic maximum MRS over all households, an index of the most
deprived. In this approximation, all households fully donate their future consumption to the most deprived.
Intuitive and appealing as it is, this linear approximation is preposterously crude in the calibrated econ-
omy (CRRA = 2.5). While ineﬃciency is ρx = .109·Σxh
0, the approximation is over fourfold, Lx = .457·Σxh
0.
The linear approximation is crude because of a law of diminishing willingness to pay. Given a direction
z ∈ RS of change in future consumption, change z(t): =tz is parameterized by its ”size” 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
H o wd o e st h ew i l l i n g n e s st op a y w(z(t)) for a change depends on its size? It turns out that w(z(t)) is
concave—the willingness to pay for a marginal change is diminishing.
In sum, marginal rates of substitution are useful to detect ineﬃciency, but inept to quantify it.
1.2.2 A classical social program is a better foundation







namely, maximizing future social welfare F : RSH
+ → R,F(y1): =Σµhuh
1(yh
1) with weights µh := 1
uh0
0 (x0)
constrained by future resources r1 := Σxh
1.
3The discrete approximation (theorem 2) is intuitive,
ρx ≤ Dx := F∗ − F(x1) (2)
just the failure to solve the social program. The quadratic approximation (theorem 3) is less intuitive,
itself a function of the discrete one,




0 +2 T0 · Dx − T0 (3)
where T0 := ΣTh




These approximations are increasingly sharper, in that ρx ≤ Qx ≤ Dx ≤ Lx (proposition 3). The
sharpening is dramatic in the calibrated economy (CRRA = 2.5):
Approximate inefficiency 
















The quadratic is excellent, the discrete very good, the linear preposterous.
Both are precise at Pareto eﬃciency, where ρx =0 . To see why, we recall the classical result that a
Pareto eﬃcient interior allocation solves supyÀ0,Σyh=r Σµhuh(yh), which thanks to time separable utilities
u = u0 + u1 in turn implies it solves F∗, i.e. F∗ = F(x1). Thus at a Pareto eﬃcient interior allocation,
both approximations (2), (3) take value 0, precisely ρx.
Lastly we note how all results extend to economies with multiple goods. The key is to let current income
I0 play the role of the numeraire, with current utility u0(x0) replaced by its indirect utility v0(p0,I 0). Now
ineﬃciency and all bounds on it are deﬁn e di nt e r m so ft h ea l l o c a t i o n (I0,x 1) as before, as well as current
prices p0. Although multiple goods underlie much of the literature on the generic presence of equilibrium
ineﬃciency, they seem immaterial for the size of ineﬃciency. After all, with state separable preferences, in
each state the equilibrium allocation of goods already is Pareto eﬃcient; only the interstate allocation of
income might not be—and income is a numeraire as above.
1.3 Related literature
The closest literature is purely qualitative, on the Pareto ineﬃciency of asset market equilibria, following
Stiglitz (1982) as cited above. Adding a quantitative dimension is what motivates the measure of ineﬃciency,
estimating it in a calibrated economy and approximating it is a general economy.
This literature lacks a quantitative dimension because of its very technique, linearization. Linearization
is limited to inﬁnitesimal reallocations. It tells whether there is a direction of reallocation (in the sense
of directional derivative) that Pareto improves the equilibrium allocation. Although conclusions at the
4inﬁnitesimal scale extend to conclusions at the neighborhood scale, they do not beyond; indeed, a direction
that is improving if followed inﬁnitesimally may become impairing if followed ﬁnitely:
 
Accordingly, linearization is mute on the size of the Pareto improvements it proves to exist. In contrast, our
measure of ineﬃciency does quantify Pareto improvements, and is unconstrained by any neighborhood.
An apparently close literature, which is quantitative, is on the welfare cost of business cycles, following
Lucas (1987) as cited above. In truth, it deals with payments for smoothing (changing) total future income,
whereas we focus on payments for allocating (ﬁxing) total future income.
The paper’s organization follows. Section 2 quantiﬁes ineﬃciency in terms of willingness to pay. Section
3 numerically computes the ineﬃciency of an economy calibrated to US income mobility, income distribution,
and savings rates. Section 4 describes the method for deriving formulas for approximate ineﬃciency of a
general economy. Section 5 shows how marginal rates of substitution approximate ineﬃciency, but only
crudely in the calibrated economy, because of a law of diminishing willingness to pay. Section 6 derives
alternative approximations, sharper in general and accurate in the calibrated economy. Finally, Section 7
is an extension to multiple goods. An appendix contains proofs.
2 Quantifying ineﬃciency
Ineﬃciency is a qualitative notion—we seek to quantify it. The idea is in the spirit of Debreu’s (1951)
coeﬃcient of resource utilization, but emphasizes willingness to pay and the timing of payment.
Let º be a preference on R
1+S
++ , whose points (x0,x 1) specify consumption of a sole good in the
present 0 and in the future states of nature 1,...,S. Let x be a status quo consumption, and z À −x1
a change in future consumption. The willingness to pay for this change, in terms of current consumption,
is by deﬁnition the supremum w ∈ R such that
x +( −w,z) % x (4)
Fixing the status quo, this deﬁnes a function w = w(z) bounded above by x0, whose argument we
occasionally omit.6 It may take negative values, interpretable as compensation.
6The set of w such that (4) is bounded above by x0; if nonempty, its supremum exists by completeness of R. Nonemptiness
holds if the preference obeys 0-desirability: x ∈ R
1+S
++ ,x 1 + z ∈ RS
++ ⇒ (x0 − w,x1 + z) % x for some w ∈ R, possibly
negative. So w(z) ≤ x0 is deﬁned.
5Remark 1 If preference is continuous and Inada in current consumption, then (4) holds with indiﬀerence
at the willingness to pay w(z). Further, if the preference is increasing in current consumption, a solution
w of x +( −w,z) ∼ x is unique.7
The timing of payment—out of current consumption, not future—matches the interpretation of preferences
as being ex ante the realization of the state of nature. Ex post, the willingness to pay in the realized state
s may be diﬀerent, if naturally deﬁned, such as with state-separable preferences.
We quantify ineﬃciency in terms of willingness to pay. Let the economy (º,x) specify for each
household h =1 ,...,H a preference, as in remark 1, and a status quo consumption; let wh be the implied
willingness to pay functions.
Deﬁnition 1 The ineﬃciency of (º,x) is the value ρx of
supΣwh(zh) s.t. x1 + z À 0,Σzh =0 (5)
The measure is for ordinal preferences, denominated in current resources, and lies in [0,Σxh
0].8 It
is society’s supremum willingness to pay for an allocation that, with the payment, is just weakly Pareto
improving. A solution z of this problem, if it exists, is an optimal arbitrage. An arbitrageur could elicit
Σwh in the present, without adding to future resources.
There is a computationally useful characterization of optimal arbitrage:
Proposition 1 Suppose in addition preferences are transitive.9 Suppose z ∈ RSH is feasible for (5). Then
it is a solution iﬀ the xh +( −wh,zh) deﬁne a Pareto optimum.
This implies a characterization of Pareto eﬃciency:
Corollary 1 x is Pareto eﬃcient iﬀ ρx =0 .
Occasionally, to get a measure of ineﬃciency at most 1 we quote the Σwh of problem (5) as a fraction
of current resources, Σwh = φr0, where r := Σxh is notation for resources. So current consumption
ch
0 := xh
0 − wh satisﬁes Σch
0 = ˜ φr0 with ˜ φ := 1 − φ, which is a measure of eﬃciency. A similar notion is
Debreu’s (1951) coeﬃcient of resource utilization ˜ φ, except that he requires current and future consumption
to satisfy Σch = ˜ φr. His notion refers to the fraction of resources, in every state and not just today, to which
society is willing to deprive itself and still be weakly Pareto better oﬀ. As noted, with ex ante preferences, a
willingness to pay today may disappear in a future state, a moral hazard hidden in Debreu’s (1951) timeless
model. The timing of payments is the key distinction between Debreu’s measure and ours.
Lucas (1987) asks about the willingness to pay for changing future resources r1 := Σxh
1 to their
expectation E[r1], eliminating their risk. This question is unrelated to ineﬃciency and to our measure,
which by the constraint Σzh =0 ﬁxes future resources, preserving their risk.
7Continuity means that (y0,y 1) Â x implies (˜ y0,y 1) Â x in some neighborhood ˜ y0 ≈ y0. Inada means that always
x0 − w(z) > 0. Increasingness means that x ∈ R1+S
++ ,²>0 ⇒ x +( ²,0) Â x.
8z =0 is feasible for (4) and has wh(0) = 0, so ρx ≥ Σwh(0) = 0. Since wh(zh) ≤ xh
0 whenever zh À −xh
1, the sum
Σwh(zh) ≤ Σxh
0, showing ρx ≤ Σxh
0.
9”Boundary averse” means y º x À 0 implies y À 0.
6Remark 2 (constrained ineﬃciency) Reallocations in problem (5) are state contingent. Were they con-
strained to arise from a particular policy—ﬁscal, monetary, ﬁnancial—then problem (5) would measure “policy
constrained ineﬃciency.” This would be no greater than our measure, as the feasible set would be no greater;
our measure is an upper bound on ”policy constrained ineﬃciency” for any policy.
The willingness to pay has an important representation, if the preference has a time separable u0(x0)+
u1(x1) representation. By remark 1, w is characterized by the indiﬀerence u0(x0 − w)+u1(x1 + z)=
u0(x0)+u1(x1), equivalent to an equation involving the change in future welfare ∆ := u1(x1+z)−u1(x1):
u0(x0) − u0(x0 − w)=∆ (6)
Standard conditions imply an implicit function w = w(∆) with w(0) = 0, representing the willingness to
pay in terms of changes in future welfare.
Af o r m u l af o ri n e ﬃciency is elusive, even when a formula w = w(∆) for willingness to pay is available.
This unfortunate state motivates two explorations: to numerically compute ineﬃciency arising in an asset
market equilibrium, calibrated to capture important risks, and to derive formulas for approximate ineﬃciency.
2.1 Formula in quasilinear case
We note a formula for ineﬃciency, assuming 0-quasilinear utilities, x0 +u1(x1). Equation (6) reduces to
w = ∆. The total willingness to pay is then Σwh = Σ∆h = Σuh
1(xh
1 + zh) − Σuh
1(xh














using the change of variable yh
1 = xh
1 + zh, provided the solution has xh
0 − ∆h > 0. Ineﬃciency is just the
failure to to maximize ”future social welfare” Σuh
1. This is partially generalized in section 6.
3 Estimation of the ineﬃciency of US middle age consumption
One of the great risks faced by youth is consumption in middle age. How ineﬃciently is middle age con-
sumption allocated? We use data on income mobility, income distribution and savings rates to calibrate the
economy (º,x), ap r o ﬁle of preferences and consumption distribution. For this economy we numerically
compute ineﬃciency ρx in the sense of deﬁnition 1.
3.1 Data on income mobility, income levels and savings rates
There is high risk of income mobility. Whatever one’s income quintile in youth, moving to a diﬀerent income
quintile in middle age has high probability. Estimates of the probabilities of transitioning from 1968 quintiles
to 1991 quintiles are
7transition probabilities
Â 12345
1 .54 .22 .19 .05 .01
2 .23 .25 .18 .26 .08
3 .11 .21 .24 .28 .15
4 .05 .23 .23 .19 .3
5 .07 .09 .16 .22 .46
(8)
by Gottschalk and Danzinger (1997); see their table 4.10 The probability of income mobility is at least
.46 ≤ 1 − diagonal = .46,.75,.76,.81,.54, for all 1968 quintiles.
This risk of income mobility is greatly consequential, because the income distribution is greatly unequal.
The median incomes of 1968, 1991 quintiles are (in 1991 dollars)
I1968 :9 ,774 20,722 29,682 40,330 70,802
I1991 :9 ,315 22,725 35,570 51,317 96,501
(9)
by McNeill (1999).11 Every 1991 median exceeds the preceding median by 45% or more.
This inequality in incomes implies inequality in consumption. Estimates of the quintiles’ savings rates
are (in 1973)
σq = −.45,.− .015,.09,.175,.286 (10)
by Bosworth, Burtless, Sabelhaus (1991); see their table 5. Thus someone whose income in young age falls
in quintile q but whose income in middle age transitions to quintile Q is estimated12 to have













where R is the gross interest rate over the period, say, R =1 .65.13
3.2 Translation of data to model
We wish to deﬁne a state space consistent with income mobility (8) and income distribution (9), and to
calibrate preferences so consumption distribution (11) is optimal given the interest rate.
Time Period 0 is 1968, period 1 is 1991.
Households They are ﬁve representatives, sampled one from each 1968 income quintile. We deal with
this sample instead of the whole population to keep the state space manageable for numerical computation.
States They are all the independent quintile transitions of the sampled households, totaling 55 states.
Thus 55111 is the state where the two poorest representatives become rich and the three richest become
10Theirs is PSID data on 1968 and 1991 incomes, adjusted for family size. Only ages 22 to 62 appear.
11We switch to McNeill’s (1999) quintile incomes from Gottschalk and Danzinger’s (1997) because theirs are unreported. His
deﬁnition of income is essentially the 1995 Panel on Poverty’s, also adusted for family size.
12This estimate takes consumption and bequests as perfect substitutes, and ignores investments other than savings.
13This is the cumulated real interest rate for 1968-1991, computed from nominal yields of 1-year US Treasuries in the secondary
market, and the US GDP deﬂator. Annualized, the real interest rate is about 2.2%, and (1 + 0.022)23 ≈ 1.65.
8poor. In a random sample, multiple households can transition to the same 1991 quintile; in the economy,
multiple quintiles cannot transition to the same 1991 quintile—quintiles are equinumerous by deﬁnition.
State probabilities They are deﬁned by the product rule for independent events, reﬂecting that house-
holds are a random sample. Thus π55111 =( .01)(.08)(.11)(.05)(.07) ≈ 3 · 10−6, nearly impossible.
Assets A riskless bond with a unitary return in 1991 is tradeable in 1968 at price 1
1.65.
Consumption distribution Our notion of state s determines every household’s transition qQ, so
that (11) deﬁnes a consumption distribution, post asset trade.
We quote ineﬃciency Σwh as a fraction of total current consumption Σxh
0 =: r0, computed as follows.




Preferences Households diﬀer only in their patience parameters δ
h > 0, otherwise having a common
time separable, von Neumann-Morgenstern preference v(x0)+δ
hΣπsv(xs). The felicity v(c)= 1
1−βc1−β
has CRRA β ∈ [1.5,5], and π is the above state probability. We calibrate the patience parameters δ as
follows.
Patience parameters Given β, we calibrate each δ
h by imposing that consumption distribution (11)
is optimal, given the riskless bond’s price above. For example, if β =2 .5, the annualized patience parameters
δ
1
23 are .815,.957,.98,1.006,1.024, increasing with income in youth. Details are in section 8.1.
3.3 Estimates
We estimate the ineﬃciency of US middle age consumption by having Mathematica solve problem (1) for
the model economy (º,x) just speciﬁed.14 Plotting
ˆ ρ
r0,
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The economy is willing to pay 10−11% of its total current consumption for some reallocation of its future
total consumption, subject to leaving everyone weakly better oﬀ,p r o v i d e dt h eC R R A s β range in 1.5−3.25.
How robust are these estimates with respect to the CRRA parameter? Quite, in the range β =1 .5 ↔ 3.25.
Does the calibration pass validity tests, such as matching moments of the data? If the moment is the
growth rate of per capita income, there is a match. From outside data, the growth factor of real GDP per
capita during 1968-1991 is 1.5. In the calibrated economy, the stochastic growth factor in total income,
Is+σI0
I0 with σ = .151 the aggregate savings rate, has expectation of 1.503 and standard deviation of .34,
relative to the above state probabilities.
14The code is availale on request.
9How are we to interpret these ﬁgures about the model economy, which is not the whole economy but
merely a sample, one household from each quintile? Reallocations at the scale of the sample can be replicated
to the whole economy, since quintiles are equinumerous. (Of course, many reallocations in the whole economy
do not project to the sample.) Thus reallocations in our model economy represent a subset of the reallocations
in the whole economy. Since deﬁnition 1 involves a maximization over all reallocations, the ineﬃciency of
the whole economy is at least the plotted estimates, once normalized by its size r0 = Σxh
0.
4 Method to approximate ineﬃciency of a general economy
In the absence of a formula for the ineﬃciency of a general economy (º,x), we turn to formulas for approxi-
mate ineﬃciency. A two-step method drives all approximations of ineﬃciency ρx =s u p x1+zÀ0,Σzh=0 Σwh(zh):
• derive an upper bound on willingness to pay, wh(zh) ≤ ˆ wh(zh)
• compute the value of the relaxed problem (or an upper bound thereof)
sup
x1+zÀ0,Σzh=0
Σ ˆ wh(zh) (12)
on substituting in the deﬁnition of ρx the upper bound of step one.
Clearly,
Principle 1 Ineﬃciency is bounded above by (12).
The ﬁrst step is essentially a Taylor approximation of equation (6) characterizing willingness to pay,
u0(x0) − u0(x0 − w)=∆(z). Care is needed that this approximation is an upper bound.T h em e t h o dy i e l d s
three approximations: linear, discrete, and quadratic. Henceforth, numerical computation is absent except
to probe their accuracy in the calibrated economy of section 3.2.
5 Approximation by marginal rates of substitution: crude
Marginal rates of substitution are appealing. They detect ineﬃciency both theoretically—that households’
marginal rates of substitution are not all equal—and practically—that small Pareto improving reallocations
solve some linear system. Being so good at detecting ineﬃciency, they should be good at quantifying it.
Unfortunately, marginal rates of substitution (1) always overstate ineﬃciency, because they (2) ignore a law
of diminishing willingness to pay, and (3) tag on a quantitatively gross error, even in reasonable cases.
A natural approximation of the willingness to pay is w ≈∇ z, where ∇ is the so called marginal rates
of substitution (MRS),d e ﬁned by the requirement that (1,∇) be normal to the smooth indiﬀerence set
through x. It turns out, this fulﬁlls step one in the method:
Lemma 1 (linear approximation of willingness to pay) Suppose the preference is reﬂexive and con-
vex, and its indiﬀerence set through x À 0 is diﬀerentiable. The willingness to pay for z is at most
w ≤∇ z (13)
10By principle 1, ineﬃciency is bounded above by ∗ =s u p x1+zÀ0,Σzh=0 Σ∇





It is the stochastic maximum MRS over all households, an index of the most deprived. The solution of ∗
has all households fully donating their future consumption to the most deprived:






1 := Lx (15)
There is a reason that linearization overstates willingness to pay. Given a direction z ∈ RS of change in
future consumption, change z(t): =tz is parameterized by its ”size” 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. How does the willingness
to pay w(z(t)) for a change depends on its size?
Proposition 2 (law of diminishing willingness to pay) Suppose the preference is increasing in current
consumption and convex. Then w(z(t)) is concave. Further, w(z(t)) ≥ tw(z) for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
5.1 Crudeness
The crudeness of marginal rates of substitution in approximating ineﬃciency is apparent in the calibrated
economy of section 3.2 (CRRA β =2 .5). The ineﬃciency is ρx = .109 · r0 and the linear approximation
(15) is over fourfold, Lx = .457 · r0.
This crudeness is present in the willingness to pay as well. Let us take the preference and status quo
consumption to be that of the richest 1968 quintile, and the change z5 in future consumption to be, say, that
associated with the optimal arbitrage. The willingness to pay is w5 = 7514.08 and the linear approximation
(13) is nearly threefold, ∇
5z5 = 20392. The culprit of this crudeness is the law of diminishing willingness
to pay15, as illustrated by plotting w5(z(t)) :







Linear approximation overstates w.t.p.
In sum, marginal rates of substitution are useful to detect ineﬃciency, but inept to quantify it. Granted,
they are computationally much simpler than the ineﬃciency measure ρx. But so are the following approxi-
mations, sharper in general and accurate in the calibrated economy.
15Alvarez and Jermann (2004) linearize information about asset prices to answer Lucas’ (1987) question. They ﬁnd estimates
far exceeding Lucas’ (who does not linearize), but are mute on whether this excess owes to the linearization itself. They state
an analogue of proposition 2.
116 Sharper approximations
We derive two approximations of ineﬃciency. Compared to the linear one based on MRS, they are sharper
in general and dramatically so in the calibrated economy. Most surprisingly, inside them appears notion







Here future social welfare F : RSH
+ → R,F(y1): =Σµhuh
1(yh
1) has the weights µh := 1
uh0
0 (x0), and future
resources r1 := Σxh
1 are the status quo’s. Preferences here admit a time separable representation u0+u1.
One application of the method results in
Theorem 2 (discrete approximation of ineﬃciency) Suppose utilities for current consumption with
u0
0 > 0 ≥ u00
0. Then the allocation’s ineﬃciency is at most its failure to maximize future social welfare:
ρx ≤ F∗ − F(x1): =Dx (17)
Another application of the method results in something involving the total risk tolerance T0 := ΣTh
0 ,
where T0 := −u0
0(x0)/u00
0(x0).
Theorem 3 (quadratic approximation of ineﬃciency) Suppose utilities for current consumption with
u000
0 ≥ 0 >u 00
0,−u0
0.16 Suppose also every household has a nonnegative willingness to pay for the optimal





0 +2 T0 · [F∗ − F(x1)] − T0 := Qx (18)




0 +2 T0 · Dx − T0
A seeming weakness of theorem 3 is the high level hypothesis on the optimal arbitrage; it holds in the
calibrated economy.
DISCUSSION OF APPROXIMATIONS
Both are explicit up to F∗, which to compute requires specifying future welfare u1, as illustrated below.
Both are precise at Pareto eﬃciency. To see why, we recall the classical result that a Pareto eﬃcient
interior allocation solves supyÀ0,Σyh=r Σµhuh(yh), which thanks to time separable utilities u = u0 + u1
in turn implies x1 solves (16), i.e. F∗ = F(x1). Thus at a Pareto eﬃcient interior allocation, both
approximations (17), (18) take value 0, which by corollary 1 is precisely the value of ρx.
Approximation (17) partially generalizes formula (7).
6.1 Sharpness
How sharp are the three approximations of ineﬃciency? In general,
16Most utilities in the linear risk tolerance class satisfy this, such as CRRA >1, CARA, log, quadratic.
12Proposition 3 Suppose as in theorems 1, 2, 3. Then the linear, discrete, and quadratic approximations of
ineﬃciency are increasingly sharper:
ρx ≤ Qx ≤ Dx ≤ Lx
The sharpenings are dramatic in the calibrated economy of section 3.2 with CRRA β =2 .5.A sf r a c t i o n s
of total current consumption r0 = Σxh
0, they are:
Approximate inefficiency 
















The quadratic is excellent, the discrete very good17, the linear preposterous.
6.2 Computation with CRRA felicities
Approximations (17), (18) are explicit up to F∗, which is easy to compute in the following benchmark.
Proposition 4 Suppose households’ future utilities uh
1 = δ
hV diﬀer only in the patience parameters δ
h > 0,
having the same von Neumann-Morgenstern transform V := Σπsv(cs) of the felicity v(c)= 1
1−βc1−β with
CRRA β > 1. Then the value of problem (16) is










and r1 are total future resources.
Substituting this in expression (18) with µh = 1
uh0
0
then gives a closed formula for approximate ineﬃ-
ciency. Further, in the quadratic approximation it is easy to compute T0 = r0
β if uh
0 = v.
In contrast, a closed formula for ineﬃciency is hopeless, even in this simpliﬁed setting. By remark 1, the
equation deﬁning willingness to pay is 1
1−β (x0 − w)
1−β +δΣπs
1
1−β (xs + zs)
1−β = u, the status quo utility.













17If the total risk tolerance T0 is high enough, one can conclude the quadratic is only marginally better than the discrete










= D. But for practical purposes, this conclusion
entails computing T0, and then one may as well compute the quadratic.
137 Extension to multiple goods
A ﬁnal matter is whether the quantitative notion of ineﬃciency and the results extend to economies with
multiple commodities. This is relevant since most contributions on the existence of ineﬃciency of equilibria
with incomplete asset markets rely on the existence of multiple goods.
There is a simple extension of willingness to pay and ineﬃciency to the case of L>1 commodities per
state. It sacriﬁces generality slightly for simplicity. Thus suppose that preferences admit utility representa-
tions that are time separable, u0(x0)+u1(x1), where (x0,x 1) ∈ R
L(1+S)
+ , and that v0 = v0(p0,I 0) denotes
the indirect utility associated with u0. Deﬁne a pseudo state space as {1,...,S}×{1,...,L}, with S∗ := SL
future states. Deﬁne a pseudo utility on R
1+S∗
+ by ˜ u(I0,y 1): =v0 (p0,I 0)+u1(y1), given period 0 prices
p0. The willingness to pay for a change z ∈ RS∗
in future consumption, in terms of current consumption,
is by deﬁnition the supremum w ∈ R such that
˜ u(I∗
0 − w,x1 + z) ≥ ˜ u(I∗
0,x 1) (19)
where I∗
0 := p0x0 is the income necessary for the status quo current consumption x0, in analogy to (4).
We note that if x0 is optimal in that v0 (p0,I∗
0)=u0 (x0), then the right side of (19) is just the status quo
welfare u0(x0)+u1(x1), so w(0) = 0 provided u0 is increasing.
Deﬁnition 2 Given a current spot price p0 ∈ RL
++, the ineﬃciency of (º,x) is the value ρx,p0 of
supΣwh(zh) s.t. x1 + z À 0, Σzh =0 (20)
Proposition 1 extends:
Proposition 5 Suppose u0 is continuous and increasing. Suppose z ∈ RHS∗
is feasible for (20). Then it
is a solution iﬀ the (I∗h
0 ,x h
1)+( −wh,zh) deﬁne a Pareto optimum (with respect to pseudo utilities).
The lemmata describing the three approximations of willingness to pay extend :
Lemma 2 (linear) Suppose the preference is reﬂexive and convex, and its indiﬀerence set through x À 0
is diﬀerentiable. The willingness to pay for z is at most
wh ≤∇
hzh










Lemma 4 (quadratic) Assume v000
0 ≥ 0 >v 00
0. If ∆ ≥ 0 then willingness to pay is at most
w ≤− T0 +
s
T2









14As before, these approximations are unambiguously ranked:
Proposition 6 Suppose as in the lemmata. Then these approximations of willingness to pay are increasingly
sharper,
ineﬃciency ≤ quadratic ≤ discrete ≤ linear
Lastly, the law of diminishing returns also holds, by an identical argument.
That these upper bounds on willingness to pay translate into upper bounds on ineﬃciency is merely a
notational extension, omitted.
8A p p e n d i x
8.1 Calibrating patience parameters
For bond purchases θ to maximize the welfare u(x)=v(x0)+δ
hΣπsv(xs) of the consumption x =
(I0 − qθ,I 1 + θ) they ﬁnance, they must satisfy the FOC:
x
−β
0 q = δΣπsx−β
s











Evaluating (21) at the consumption distribution x and the state probabilities π gives δ
h as a function
of the CRRA parameter β.
8.2 Proposition 1
Proof. Necessity by contradiction. Let z be a solution where the xh+(−wh,zh) admit a Pareto superior
reallocation y ∈ R
H(S+1)
++ , so that Σyh
0 = r0 − Σwh and Σyh
1 = Σxh
1, and yh %h xh +( −wh,zh) without
indiﬀerence for some i. By (4) and transitivity, yh %h xh. Reduce yi
0 to yi
0 − ² by some ²>0. By
continuity in current consumption, a small enough ² is feasible, in that still yi +( −²,0) Âi xi +( −wi,zi)
%i xi . But now this modiﬁed ˜ y0 (identical to y0 but for household i)s u m s t or0 − Σwh − ². Set
˜ y := (˜ y0,y 1) so ˜ yh %h xh. Set a := ˜ y − x so that ˜ yh = xh +( −(−ah
0),a h
1) %h xh and Σah
1 =0 .






(r0 − Σwh − ²) − r0
¤
= Σwh + ², which
exceeds Σwh = ρx, the supremum total willingness to pay for some future reallocation z (which a1 is), a
contradiction.
Suﬃciency by contraposition. Let ˜ z be a counterexample to z being a solution. Consider the two
allocations (xh
0 − wh(˜ zh),x h
1 +˜ zh), (xh
0 − wh(zh),x h
1 + zh). By remark 1, they are indiﬀerent to xh, hence
to each other by transitivity. By hypothesis, Σwh(˜ zh) > Σwh(zh), so that the ﬁrst allocation has lower
current resources than, but of course equal future resources to, the second. Thus change the ﬁrst allocation
by taking the aforementioned current slack and distributing it evenly over households; being increasing in
current consumption, this makes the (so modiﬁed) ﬁrst allocation preferred to the second one, using the
same resources, showing the second one is not Pareto optimal.
158.3 Corollary 1
Proof. Necessity. By hypothesis, x is Pareto eﬃcient, and wh(0) = 0 in any case, so (xh
0−wh(0),x h
1)=xh
is Pareto eﬃcient. By proposition 1, z =0 solves problem (5). So the problem’s value is ρx = Σwh(0) =
Σ0=0 .
Suﬃciency. Suppose y ∈ R
H(S+1)
++ ,Σyh = Σxh with yh %h xh. Rewrite as yh = xh +( −(xh
0 −
yh
0),zh) %h xh, deﬁning z := y1 − x1. Then wh(zh) ≥ xh
0 − yh
0 by deﬁnition of willingness to pay, so
Σwh(zh) ≥ Σ(xh
0 − yh
0)=0 . Conversely, Σwh(zh) ≤ ρx because z is feasible for problem (5) and ρx its
value. So if ρx =0 , then Σwh(zh)=0 . So the ah := xh +( −wh(zh),zh) satisfy Σah = Σxh, are Pareto
eﬃcient by remark 1, and indiﬀerent to x.T h u s x is itself Pareto eﬃcient.
8.4 Lemma 1, theorem 1
The proposition relies on a simple global-inﬁnitesimal principle for smooth convex preferences: if x +
(z0,z) º x then (1,∇(x)) · (z0,z) ≥ 0.
Proof. Let w be the willingness to pay for z,so that x+(−w,z) ∼ x. Since also x ∼ x, convexity implies
x+t(−w,z) % x with ∗ = tz for, say, t = 1
2. By the global-inﬁnitesimal principle, (1,∇(x))·(−w,z) ≥ 0,
i.e. w ≤∇ (x)) · z.















1. So the value is at most the claimed one, which is actually achieved by z := −x1.
8.5 Proposition 2
Proof. w(z(t)) ≥ tw(z) By remark 1, the willingness to pay w = w(z) makes (4) hold with indiﬀerence.
Thus w solves x +( −w,z) ∼ x. Of course, x +( −0,0) ∼ x. By convexity of the preference, the t-convex
combination of the latter left sides is weakly preferred to x : x +( −tw,z(t)) % x, where t0 := 1 − t. Since
w(z(t)), the wtp for z(t), is the supremum s such that x +( −s,z(t)) % x, it follows w(z(t)) ≥ tw.
Concavity Fix s,t ∈ [0,1] and a ∈ [0,1]; we want w(z(as + a0t)) ≥ aw(z(s)) + a0w(z(t)), where
a0 := 1 − a. The following indiﬀerences hold: x +( −w(z(s)),z(s)) ∼ x,x +( −w(z(t)),z(t)) ∼ x. By
convexity of the preference, x+(−aw(z(s))−a0w(z(t)),∗) % x where ∗ = az(s)+a0z(t)=z(as+a0t). As
above, by deﬁnition of wtp as the supremum, w(∗) ≥ aw(z(s)) + a0w(z(t)).
8.6 Theorem 2
We analyze equation (6), which characterizes the willingness to pay w for a change z in future consumption,
repeated here:
u0(x0) − u0(x0 − w)=∆ (22)
Note, ∆,w=0 satisfy this equation; since u0 is increasing, one is positive (negative) iﬀ the other is, hence
Remark 3 The signs of w,∆ agree.
16Lemma 5 (discrete approximation of willingness to pay) Suppose u0
0 > 0 ≥ u00
0. Then willingness to






Proof. By the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, u0(x0)−u0(x0 −w)=w
R 1
0 u0
0(x0 −w +tw)dt. This





0(x0 − w + tw)dt
(24)
Since u00
0 ≤ 0, the integrand is bounded as u0
0(x0) S u0
0(x0 −w +tw) according as w T 019, i.e. according
as ∆ T 0 (by remark 3), giving (23).


















1 + zh) − Σµhuh
1(xh
1)=F(x1 + z) − F(x1)
On changing variables as y1 = x1 + z and recalling the deﬁnition of F∗, this is shown.
8.7 Theorem 3
Lemma 6 (quadratic approximation of willingness to pay) Suppose u000
0 ≥ 0 >u 00
0,−u0
0.20 If ∆ ≥ 0









Proof. Rewrite expression (24) as ∆
w =
R
. (If w =0 , then ∆ =0 by remark 3 and the inequality is















































0 (1 − t)f(t)dt. Since u000
0 ≥ 0, in the last integrand we have
u00
0 T u00

















0(x0 − w + tw) if w ≥ 0; and u0
0(x0) ≥ u0
0(x0 − w + tw) if w ≤ 0.
20Most utilities in the linear risk tolerance class satisfy this, such as CRRA >1, CARA, log, quadratic.








2 . Dividing by −u00









































. This is increasing in the Dh. The proof of theorem 2












Note, ΣDh ≤ Dx will be binding, as the objective is monotone in the Dh. Since the objective is concave












0 · Dh or ( 1
λ2 −1)Th
0 =2·Dh, which aggregated implies
( 1
λ2 − 1) = 2D
T 0 so that Dh = Dx
T h
0








































The proposition relies on a fact: a direction that is globally improving is necessarily locally improving, that
tangents lie above the graph of a concave function:
Lemma 7 Suppose f : A → R is C1 and concave. Then for all a + z ∈ A, interior a ∈ A
f(a + z) − f(a) ≤ Df(a)z (27)
Proof. of proposition 3. Dx ≤ Lx .W er e c a l lDx =s u p x1+zÀ0,Σzh=0 Σ∆h
uh0
0
and Lx =m a x x1+zÀ0,Σzh=0 Σ∇
hzh,












0 +2 T0 · Dx−T0. Inequal-

























s) where mh := µhδ
h. Clearly,






The Kuhn-Tucker method leads to the solution yh









s where k := 1
1−βΣmh ¡
τh¢1−β . This simpliﬁes to k = Mβ
1−β, on substituting τ.
Thus as = Mβ
1−βr1−β
s = Mβv(rs) and F∗ = Mβ · Σπsv(rs)=Mβ · V (r1).
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